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Abstract
Work requirements can make it easier to screen the poor from the non-
poor. They can also aﬀect future poverty by changing the poors’ incentive
to invest in their income capacity. The novelty of our study is the focus on
long term poverty. We find that the argument for using work requirements
as a screening device is both strengthened and weakened with long term
poverty, and that the possibility of using work requirements weakens the
incentives to exert eﬀort to escape poverty. We also show that the two
incentive problems, to screen poverty and deter poverty, are interwoven;
the fact that the poor can exert an eﬀort to increase their probability of
being non-poor in the future, makes it easier to separate the poor from the
non-poor in the initial phase of the program. Finaly we show that if it is
possible to commit to a long term poverty alleviation program it is almost
always optimal to impose some work requirements on those that receive
transfers.
Keywords: long-term poverty, ratchet eﬀect, moral hazard, screening.
JEL-code: D82, I38.
1 Income transfers and incentive problems
When funds are made available to alleviate poverty, a welfare administrator faces
at least two challenges. The first question he or she (but ’she’ hereafter) needs
to address is how to channel these funds to those in real need of them. This
is a screening or sorting problem, and ignoring it leads to unnecessarily large
outlays, in the form of transfers flowing to people not in need of support. At
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the same time, there are many reasons why a person may live below the poverty
line. One reason is that he or she (but ’he’ hereafter) has not exerted suﬃcient
eﬀort to increase his skill level. If poor people can (to some extent) influence
their future earnings capacity, there is also a potential moral hazard problem the
welfare administrator needs to keep in mind: welfare assistance policies might
discourage the poor to invest in their future earnings capacity.
Welfare assistance can be granted in several ways, depending on what the
welfare administrator can observe and on the instruments at hand: as subsidy
schemes, means-testing, in-kind transfers. In this paper, we focus on workfare
programs—that is, program that make transfers contingent on the acceptance of
a work requirement—and evaluate how successful these are both at screening and
at solving the moral hazard problem when people happen to remain poor during
a longer time.
We are not the first to evaluate workfare programs in the light of these consid-
erations. Most notably, it has been addressed in a formal model by Besley and
Coate (1992). The novelty of our study is the focus on long-term poverty. We
let individuals’ income opportunities be correlated over time. This assumption
adds a new dimension to the poverty alleviation problem, since it enables the
welfare administrator to collect information about peoples’ income opportunities
as time passes. Potential welfare claimants might understand this and adjust
their behavior accordingly.
To get a rough idea of how the dynamics influence the costs and benefits of
using workfare, consider the problem of targeting the poor. Let there be two
groups of individuals in society, one with a low income potential, we call them
L-individuals, and one with a high income potential, we call them H-individuals.
The government wants to guarantee everyone a minimum income z, which is
higher than the income L earns in the market, but lower than the income H
earns. H-individuals may nevertheless claim benefits intended for the poor, since
the welfare administrator cannot observe a person’s income opportunities. It is to
prevent such fraudulent behavior that workfare may be used. Requiring welfare
recipients to work c hours in the public sector to qualify for transfers, makes
it costly for those with a relatively high earning capacity to join the program.
Every hour spent in a public sector job could alternatively be used in the private
sector, and since an H-person has a relatively high income potential this loss
is relatively high. The negative eﬀect of workfare is that a work requirement
reduces the poor’s market income and thus necessitates larger transfers to the
poor in order to guarantee them an income above the poverty line.
Ignore for a moment the learning aspect associated with long-term poverty.
Assume for example that there is no correlation between a person’s present and
future earning capacity (i.e. there exists only short-term poverty). Let the pro-
portion of genuinely poor be low. There are, in other words, a lot of potential
fraudulent claimants around and it is important to deter non-poor from joining
the poverty program. Let cs be the minimum level of public work that scares
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H-individuals oﬀ the poverty program. As we have constructed the problem, the
government minimizes costs by imposing a workfare program that requires the
poor to work cs hours in exchange for their benefits.
Assume now that individual earning capacities are correlated over time. This
means that the welfare administrator can learn more about peoples’ income po-
tential by keeping a record of their past behavior. In fact, since a work require-
ment of cs separated the two groups, she correctly infers that those who partici-
pated in the workfare program are genuinely poor. If she is free to change policy
later on, she will certainly not make individuals work for their benefits in later
periods of the poverty program. Now that the screening is done, it is only costly
to use workfare. But, and this is the crux of the argument, if H-individuals per-
ceive that welfare will be provided unconditionally at a later stage in the poverty
program, they will not be discouraged from participating in a poverty program
that requires individuals to work cs hours in the first phase of the program.
As this example indicates, in a multi-period framework it becomes essential to
specify whether or not policy makers can commit to the design of future poverty
alleviation policies. We evaluate the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent policy programs
both with and without commitment.
Optimal policy
When poverty is long-term, and poverty reducing eﬀort is of little avail, we
find that work requirements should in general be concentrated to the first period
of the programme. Compared with the cost eﬃcient policy for eliminating short
term poverty, we find that workfare, as opposed to universal welfare, becomes a
more eﬃcient policy in containing the overall costs when poverty is long term.
In some cases though—which we specify in detail later—the concentrated use of
work requirements will scare away the poor from the programme. To avoid that,
the welfare administrator should allocate work requirements more evenly in time,
even though this implies that fewer non-poor people separate.
Once the possibilities to escape poverty become significant, a new screening
problem presents itself in the next period: to screen those that failed to escape
poverty from those that didn’t. Poverty reducing eﬀort thus gives rise to a
sequence of screening problems. This sounds like bad news. But in fact, it
need not be. The existence of a new screening problem in the future makes it
easier for the WA to commit to work requirements in the future. This, in turn,
makes it easier to screen the non-poor from the poor in the first period. To put
it diﬀerently, poverty reducing eﬀort allows for some substitution of today’s work
requirements for future work requirements, and in some cases this lowers the total
cost of alleviating poverty. We should note, though, that this substitution in itself
reduces the poors’ incentive to make an eﬀort in the first period to increase their
future income potential. But in terms of overall costs, it is eﬃcient.
In the final section of the paper we characterize optimal design of a poverty
alleviation program if the welfare administrator can commit to a long term pro-
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gram. If we isolate the screening issue, we find that the optimal commitment
policy coincides with the equilibrium policy under non-commitment. When we
in addition take account of how future policy aﬀect the poor’s’ incentive to exert
poverty reducing investments, we find that it is almost always optimal to impose
some work requirements on those that receive transfers. More specifically, it is
optimal to impose on welfare claimants either a very high work requirement or
a low one. This result, diﬀers from the conclusion drawn by Besley and Coate
(1992); they find that it is sometimes optimal to commit to a pure welfare pro-
gram. The reason for this diﬀerence is that when Besley and Coate (implicitly)
assume commitment, they focus solely on the deterrence problem. We study a
welfare administrator that has two concerns; in addition to give the poor strong
incentives to undertake poverty reducing investments the policy must also be
appropriate given the screening problem faced at this stage.
Methodology and related literature
In addition to the light our model sheds on an important policy issue, we
believe it has some methodological interest. Formally, we study the design of
a dynamic Bayesian game. Our problem is therefore closely related to the lit-
erature on dynamic principal agent relationships which emphasize the role that
asymmetric information and long-term commitment plays in governance. Our
problem of alleviating long-term poverty resembles the basic structure of for ex-
ample a dynamic regulation problem. Still, the results we derive diﬀer sharply
from those obtained there. A central result in optimal regulation is that a reg-
ulator who is able to commit herself to a multi-period contract, ought to repeat
the optimal static policy in every period (cf Laﬀont and Tirole, 1990). This pol-
icy is however not time consistent; the regulator will not follow the plan if she
is free to re-optimize later on. Lack of commitment is therefore detrimental in
a standard dynamic regulation problem.1 In poverty alleviation it is not always
optimal to repeat the static program in each period, and, as a consequence of
this, lack of intertemporal commitment is not always a problem. Another notable
feature of our model is that if a semi-separating equilibrium exists, it involves
randomization from both the agents (welfare recipients) and the principal (the
welfare administrator).
Before we dig deeper into the details of our arguments, we should say some-
thing about the scope of our perspective, and how it relates to existing literature.
The literature on how policy instruments can be used to target transfers to the
poor is extensive—see Lipton and Ravallion (1995) for a discussion and for refer-
1Weitzman (1980) was the first to use a principal agent framework to point out the negative
eﬀects lack of intertemporal commitment has on the agents behaviour. Freixas et al (1985)
developed the first game theoretic analysis of a dynamic principal-agent relationship governed
by linear incentive schemes. For other references and for a general discussion of this topic, see
chapters 9 and 10 in Laﬀont and Tirole (1993). Dillén and Lundholm (1996) use the framework
developed by Freixas et al to discuss optimal income taxation and redistribution in a dynamic
model.
4
ences. Although the possibility of using work requirement to screen the needy
from the not-so-needy had been discussed before, Besley and Coate (1992) was
the first paper that gave a detailed analysis of the argument.2 It is their model
we extend to a dynamic environment. We think this is an important extension,
both because there is virtually no theoretical work on the dynamics of poverty
programs, and because long term poverty is a serious problem: a substantial
share of those who live below the poverty line do so persistently.3
Admittingly, the “cost eﬃciency perspective” on poverty alleviation and the
eﬀects of workfare that we borrow from Besley and Coate, is narrow. One limi-
tation is that it considers work requirements solely as a stick that scares the non
poor from claiming benefits and poor from not doing anything to improve their
situation. This is obviously not the whole story. Having a job can also be seen as
an essential aspect of life, something that provides people with social recognition
and self esteem. Another important point is that making welfare claimants work
for their benefits may prevent a deterioration of their working moral and human
capital. Furthermore, it is not obvious that individuals are poor—as we assume—
because they are endowed with an insuﬃcient earning capacity. Alternatively,
one may argue that it is the lack of well functioning economic institutions to
deal with property rights, information problems, etc. which is the main reason
why so many people live in poverty—see Hoﬀ (1996). We also ignore the political
legitimacy of diﬀerent poverty alleviation programs—see Besley (1996). We are
not saying that these arguments are unimportant, only that they are irrelevant
for the incentive problem we focus on.
Having pointed out the limits of our scope, we should, however, hasten to
add that we believe the problem we point at warrants attention. Our argu-
ments should be mentioned in a general debate about how one ought to provide
assistance to the long-term poor, which is an important debate, both in develop-
ing countries and more modern welfare states. In fact the problem of finding a
cost eﬀective way to provide assistance to the poor is a highly current topic in
many European welfare states where a tightening of public finance constraints
has forced welfare administrators to cut their budgets.
The next section presents a formal model of the costs and benefits of using
2See also Besely and Coate (1995).
3For example, Heady et al (1994) find that 10 % of the population in Germany are frequently
poor or near-poor. Rodgers & Rodgers (1993) conclude that about one third of measured
poverty in the US as of 1987 can be regarded as ’chronic’, and that over the period they
studied, ”poverty not only increased, it became more chronic and less transitory in nature” (p
51). Adams & Duncan (1988), in a study of US urban poverty, estimated that of the 13.4%
of urban people that where poor in 1979, 34.6% were poor in at least one year between 1974
and 1983, and 5.2% was ’persistently poor’—defined as poor in 8 out of 10 years or 80% of the
years covered.
In poor underdeveloped countries the problem of chronic poverty is even more pronounced,
Gibson (2001) uses data from a recent household survey in Papua New Guinea to conclude that
close to half of those classified as poor, has a chronic poverty problem.
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workfare in targeting the poor. In section 3 we characterize the cost minimizing
program in a static framework. In section 4, which is the heart of the paper, we
introduce dynamics and study how workfare can be used to minimize the cost
of providing transfers to the long term poor. In section 5 we include poverty-
reducing investments. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 A formal model of the costs and benefits of
using workfare to target benefits to the poor
As a prerequisite to the dynamic analysis, we analyze poverty alleviation in a
static (one period) model. We focus solely on the screening problem. It is nat-
ural to postpone the discussion of poverty-reducing investments, since we need a
dynamic model to asses how workfare aﬀect the poor’s’ present eﬀort to escape
future poverty.
We follow Besley and Coate (1992) and assume that an administrator of a
welfare program, hereafter referred to as the WA, faces a target population of a
size normalized to 1. A fraction γ has a very low productivity aL and a fraction
(1− γ) is endowed with a higher productivity aH . We stress here that the latter
also are ’low class’, but not as destitute as the former. All people have the same
strictly concave utility function defined over disposable income (x) and leisure (`),
u(x, `), and a time endowment normalized to unity. People choose the amount
of private sector labor which maximizes their utility level. Without any welfare
program, the L-people (and only L-people) earn a disposable income below the
poverty line z. The WA faces the task of designing a cost minimizing welfare
program that guarantees everybody at least the minimal income z.
A welfare program consists of the menu {(bL, cL) , (bH , cH)}, where b is a
money transfer and c the number of hours of public work an applicant is required
to carry out in order to qualify for the transfer.4 The menu must guarantee
that: (i) all people voluntarily participate in the program, (ii) everybody at
least enjoys a disposable income z, (iii) nobody has an incentive to apply for the
package intended for somebody with a diﬀerent productivity, and (iv) the total
cost of the program, γbL + (1 − γ)bH , is kept at a minimum (because it will be
financed by distortionary taxation on the other people in the economy).
Individual behaviour
An individual with ability a, receiving the package (b, c) decides how much
income (y) to earn:
max
y≥0
u(b+ y, 1− c− y
a
).
4As in the Besley-Coate paper, we shall assume that public sector work is unproductive. We
discuss the impact of this assumption in footnote 17.
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Let us denote the solution by y(b, c, a). Normality of consumption and leisure
means that as long as y(b, c, a) > 0, the derivatives w.r.t. c and b are negative.
Regarding the latter, Moﬃtt (1992, p 16)) reports on an absolute value of .37
for females, while Sawhill (1988, p 1103) reports on absolute values in the range
[.16,.71].
The corresponding maximal utility level is written as v(b, c, a). Note that if
the transfer b and/or the work requirement c are very high, it may be optimal to
refrain from working privately altogether—the utility level then reduces to u(b, 1−
c). Note also that our concavity assumptions on u (·) implies vbb < 0.
The costs of workfare
The aim of the transfer policy is to guarantee L-people a disposable income
of at least z. For a given work requirement cL, let bL(cL) be the lowest transfer
that accomplishes this. It is defined as
bL(cL) + y(bL(cL), cL, aL) = z.
Implicit derivation shows that dbL(cL)dcL = aL: a higher work requirement crowds
out private sector earnings with aL, and thus requires an extra aL Euro to top
up disposable income to the poverty line. Imposing a work requirement is thus
costly because it necessitates larger transfers to needy people.
We define cco as the work requirement that crowds out private sector earnings
completely:5
cco
def
= max{c : y(bL(c), c, aL) ≥ 0}.
The necessary transfer bL(c) thus satisfies
bL(c) = bL(0) + aLc if c ≤ cco,
= z c ≥ cco,
and is clearly concave in c.
Another important value is the work requirement that brings L down to his
reservation utility level:
cmax
def
= max{c : v(bL(c), c, aL) ≥ v(0, 0, aL)}.
Clearly, cmax puts an upper bound on theWA’s selection of work requirements.
The benefits of workfare
The WA has to oﬀer appropriate incentives to prevent H-individuals from
joining the poverty program. She must make sure that an H-person gets a utility
level at least as high as the one he gets when pretending to be poor. Pretending
5For a suﬃciently high poverty line (compared to Ls earnings capacity aL), this work re-
quirement may drop to zero: even without work requirement, the transfer necessary to raise L
to the poverty line is so large that it crowds out private earnings completely.
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to be poor can be easy or diﬃcult, depending on what the WA observes. One
possibility is that the WA observes no personal characteristics of the applicants;
applying for a welfare package is then a suﬃcient condition for getting it. But
one could also imagine that the WA observes private sector earnings, and that
welfare applicants qualify for transfers only when their earnings do not exceed a
certain limit. In this paper, we limit ourselves to analyse the first case.6
The maximum utility H gets if he receives a transfer bH in exchange for a
work requirement cH is thus v(bH , cH , aH). On the other hand, when H pretends
to be of type L, he attains a welfare level v(bL(cL), cL, aH). The screening, or no
mimicking constraint can thus be written as
v(bH , cH , aH) ≥ v(bL(cL), cL, aH).
Obviously, it is optimal to choose cH = 0. Supplementing bH with a positive
work requirement implies a higher transfer to H, which increases the total cost of
the program. To ease exposition, we drop the subscript on the work requirement
since this policy is only relevant for the program intended for the poor.
Let bsH(c) be the minimum transfer H must receive in order not to register as
poor (the superscript s indicates that we are analyzing a static problem). This
is an information rent—resources H receives because the WA cannot observe his
earning capacity. Its magnitude is implicitly defined by
v(bsH(c), 0, aH) = v(bL(c), c, aH). (2.1)
Requiring the poor to work for their benefits makes it less attractive for H to
mimic L and thus the minimum transfer bsH can be reduced. The following
lemma informs about the shape of bsH(c) (proven in appendix).
Lemma 1 The transfer function bsH(c) has the following first and second deriv-
atives:
dbsH(c)
dc
= −(aH − aL) if c < cco
= −aH if cco ≤ c ≤ cmax,
d2bsH(c)
dc2
= 0.
Moreover bsH(0) = bL(0).
By the last property, universal welfare is equivalent to c = 0.
Since the transfer function is decreasing and concave in c there exists a critical
value for the work requirement on L-persons, cs, for which the transfer bH can
6The income observable case is discussed in Besley & Coate (1992) for short term poverty
alleviation and in Schroyen & Torsvik (1999) for long term poverty alleviation.
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be set to zero and still secure self-selection, i.e. bsH(c
s) ≡ 0. It is easy to see that
cs < cmax. Figures 1a and 1b display bL(c) and bsH(c).
Insert figure 1 here
3 The cost minimizing static program
We can now construct the function which maps the work requirement c into the
total cost of the welfare program,
Ks(c)
def
= γbL(c) + (1− γ)bsH(c).
By definition, this function gives—for any arbitrary work requirement—the min-
imal pair of transfer payments which satisfy both the poverty alleviation and
incentive compatibility constraints (the poverty alleviation restriction is taken
care of by the function bL(c), while the self-selection constraint for H-agents is
verified because they receive a transfer specified by the function bsH(c)). As H-
persons always have the option to stay away from the programme, they cannot
be imposed any taxes. This is equivalent to requiring that bH(c) ≥ 0 or c ≤ cs.
The welfare administrator’s problem can therefore be written as the following
one dimensional optimization problem:
min
c≤cs
Ks(c).
Since both transfer functions are piecewise linear but concave in c, there are
two possible solutions to the minimization problem: either cs or 0. Workfare is
either used so extensively that H-people do not require any rent in order not
to sign up for poverty transfers, or workfare will not be used at all and poverty
is alleviated through universal welfare. In the first case the costs of alleviating
poverty are γbL(cs); in the second, they amount to bL(0).
That the choice between welfare or workfare depends on the value of γ is
not diﬃcult to grasp. An increase in γ, reduces the gain of using workfare: the
fewer potential mimickers there are in the population, the lower is the cost of
paying them the rent which prevent them from applying for the package meant
for the really needy. In the limit, as γ approaches 1, (almost) all individuals are
of the L-type and it would be wasteful to distort the behavior of (almost) the
whole population in order to eliminate a cost (the rent to the H-people) that is
negligible.
Let γs be the value of γ for which the administrator is indiﬀerent between
choosing no work requirement and the maximal work requirement cs. It is then
easy to check that
γs
def
=
bsH(0)
bsH(0) + [bL(c
s)− bL(0)] =
bL(0)
bL(cs)
= 1− aL
aH
min{cs, cco}
cs
. (3.1)
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Thus, the WA will opt for a workfare policy when γ < γs, and otherwise for
universal welfare.
To understand what comes later when we introduce dynamics, it is important
to keep in mind that the transfer which H-agents receive (their information rent)
is a discontinuous function of γ. It is defined as
βH(γ) ≡ b
s
H(0) > 0
0
if γ > γs,
if γ ≤ γs. (3.2)
This model contains many interesting insights that we cannot elaborate on
here.7 We just mention the discontinuity of the rent function gives the prob-
lem a particular feature that prevents us from translating results from standard
dynamic principal agency problems (like the regulation literature) to our setting.
4 Dynamics and the problem of targeting the
poor
So far we have followed Besley and Coate (1992) and taken it for granted that the
information people reveal by opting for a particular poverty program cannot be
utilized by the WA later on. Suppose now that the poverty program runs over
several periods, and that the WA can learn something about people’s earning
capacity as time passes. This obviously adds a new dimension to the problem
and new questions pop up: how does lack of intertemporal commitment aﬀect
optimal policy? will it make separation of the needy from the non-needy more
diﬃcult? will work requirements become a less attractive instrument? Moreover,
in a long term setting, the question how poverty alleviation policies aﬀect the
poor’s’ incentive to undertake poverty-reducing investments becomes meaningful.
This is a moral hazard aspect that possibly interacts with the adverse selection
problem.
For didactical purposes, we first discuss the screening problem in isolation.
We start by describing the classes of equilibria that exists when theWA is unable
to commit herself to a particular poverty alleviation program in the future. Next,
we discuss the optimality of the diﬀerent equilibria. In section 5, we assume that
the poor can exert an eﬀort e in the first period that increases their probability
to escape poverty in the future. We characterize how the possibility of using
workfare in poverty alleviation aﬀects e, and how this moral hazard problem
aﬀects the diﬃculty of targeting transfers to the poor in the first place.
Finally, we state our assumptions on intertemporal preferences and opportu-
nity sets. Preferences are taken to be additive across periods, with a zero rate
of discount. Also the WA uses a zero discount rate to compute intertemporal
7For a detailed description of the static poverty alleviation problem, we refer the reader to
Besley and Coate (1992).
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costs. This choice of discount rate is not crucial to our results, but considerably
facilitates the exposition of the arguments. We do not allow individuals to save
or borrow money across periods. There are several reasons for constraining in-
dividual behavior in this way. First, we want to limit the connection between
periods to one stock variable (information). Second, once saving and borrowing
is allowed, the definition of the poverty line becomes more fuzzy. Third, it can
be regarded as a stylized representation of the poors’ imperfect access to capital
markets.
4.1 Equilibria: types and existence
The simplest framework to discuss long term poverty alleviation includes two
periods and four stages. At this stage, we also assume that individual earning
capacities are perfectly correlated over time (in section 5, we investigate how our
results change when agents can influence next period’s ability).
The structure of the game is as follows.
Period 1
Stage 1: The WA designs a first period poverty program [(b1L, c
1
L), (b
1
H , c
1
H)].
Stage 2: Individuals decide which package they want to sign up for.
Period 2
Stage 3 : The WA is not committed to any prior announcements. Given her
updated information on the basis of what she observed in stage 2,
she designs the cost minimizing poverty program [(b2L, c
2
L), (b
2
H , c
2
H)].
Stage 4: Individuals decide which packages they want to sign up for.
We can simplify this intertemporal program in several respects. First, because
the WA has to alleviate poverty in each period, she will set b1L and b
2
L equal to
bL(c
1
L) and bL(c
2
L), respectively. Second, from the static model we know that it is
never optimal to impose a work requirement on a high ability person. So at stage
3 the WA will set c2H = 0. We also claim here that if the first period transfers
given to H-persons are not ”too high”, an L-person will never want to choose the
package intended for H-persons and therefore first period transfers to H will not
be made conditional on a work requirement: c1H = 0. In the appendix, we give
suﬃcient conditions for this to be verified by the optimal policy. Thus, again, we
drop the subscript L on c without any risk of confusion.
Let γ2 be the updated belief that an agent who opted for bundle (b1L(c
1), c1)
in the first period is of type L. An H-person may find it in his interest to apply
for this package. If he does, he gets (b1L(c
1), c1) in the first period and (βH(γ
2), 0)
in period two. On the other hand, should he not register as poor he gets (b1H , 0)
in the first period and (0, 0) in the second. The values of these two options are
v (bL(c
1), c1, aH) + v (βH(γ
2), 0, aH) and v (b1H , 0, aH) + v (0, 0, aH), respectively.
Depending on the magnitude of the transfers, and the work required, there exists
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three kinds of equilibria.8 A separating equilibrium in which diﬀerent types choose
diﬀerent actions in the first period (H-people do not register as poor), a pooling
equilibrium in whichH-people register as poor, and a semi-separating equilibrium
in which H-people randomize between registering as poor or not.
Separating equilibrium
We have a separating equilibrium if an H-person prefers not to register as
poor even though the WA believes that all who do are genuinely poor (γ2 = 1).
That is, if
v
¡
b1H , 0, aH
¢
+ v (0, 0, aH) ≥ v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, aH
¢
+ v (bL(0), 0, aH) .
Separation can be induced either by a welfare policy or by a workfare policy.
The lower boundary of (b1H , c
1)−values giving rise to a separating equilibrium is
found by letting the inequality above bind. Let bdH(c
1) be defined as the minimum
transfer that induces separating for a first period work requirement c1, then
v(bdH(c
1), 0, aH) + v(0, 0, aH) =
v(bL(c
1), c1, aH) + v(bL(0), 0, aH) (4.1)
The following lemma informs about the shape of bdH(c) (proven in appendix).
Lemma 2 The transfer function bdH(c) has the following first and second deriv-
atives:
dbdH(c)
dc
=
vsb
vdb
dbsH(c)
dc
< 0
d2bdH(c)
dc2
=
(vsb)
2
vdb
[
vsbb
(vsb)
2
− v
d
bb
(vdb )
2
](
dbsH(c)
dc
)2
where vsb and v
d
b are shorthands for vb(b
s
H(c), 0, aH) and vb(b
d
H(c), 0, aH), resp.,
and likewise for the second order income derivatives vsbb and v
d
bb.
That concavity of bdH(c) is no longer guaranteed by the assumptions we have
invoked so far is easy to see when noting that the rhs of (4.1) can also be written
8The proper equilibrium concept for this game is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This means
that (i) the agents make an optimal choice in period 2 among the packages made available to
them by theWA; (ii) theWA0s design of the second period’s program should be optimal, given
her updated beliefs; (iii) the choice of the agents in stage 2 should be optimal given the packages
made available by the WA in stage 1 and taking into account the fact that the second period
program that is made available to them will depend on theWA0s updated beliefs, and therefore
on their first period choice; (iv) the WA0s choice of program in the first period is optimal given
the strategies of the agents and of her own 2nd period strategies; and (v) the WA updates her
beliefs by observing the participants’ first period behaviour, thus γ2 =Prob(agent is of type
L|agent chose in period 1 the package [bL(c1), c1]).
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as v (bsH(c
1), 0, aH) + v (b
s
H(0), 0, aH). Since b
s
H(c
1) is concave in c1, 1st period
(and thus intertemporal) utility when mimicking is strictly concave in c1. But
on the other hand the first period transfer b1H is a strictly convex function of
1st period (and thus intertemporal) utility when being honest. However, if
the first mentioned concavity is ”strong” compared with the convexity, the term
[
vsbb
(vsb )
2 − v
d
bb
(vdb )
2 ] will be negative.9 This, we assume in the sequel.
With a transfer function that is decreasing and concave in c there exists again
a critical value for the work requirement on L-persons, cd, for which the transfer
bdH can be reduced to zero while still securing self-selection, i.e. b
d
H(c
d) ≡ 0.
It is an empirical issue whether cd exceeds cmax or not. If it does, cd is not
implementable, since that would scare away L-people and make the programme
meaningless. Then, the best the WA can do is replace it by cmax and leave a
positive information rent bdH(c
max) to H-people.
Straightforward computation reveals that (i) bdH(0) > 2b
s
H(0), (ii) c
d < 2cs,
and (iii) bdH(c
s) = bsH(0). Observation (i) tells us that if the WA decides to
alleviate first period poverty by using welfare, she must oﬀer H-people more than
twice the amount she needed to give them in the static case. The reson is that vbb
is negative. Observation (ii) tells us that if she decides to use workfare to scare
fraudulent H-people oﬀ the poverty program, she has to impose a higher work
requirement than in the static case, but the number of hours that are suﬃcient
to drive H’s rent to zero is less than twice the amount needed in the static case.
The reason is again that vbb is negative.10 Both observations indicate a potential
advantage of the workfare instrument in a long term poverty context. Finally,
(iii) implies that bdH(c) everywhere lies above b
s
H(c). Figures 2a and 2b show the
relation of bdH(c) to b
s
H(c).
Insert figure 2 here.
With the two groups successfully separated in the first period, the second
period policy reduces to the first best type contingent policy: a cash transfer
bL(0) is oﬀered the poor and nothing to H-individuals.
Pooling equilibrium
9It can be shown that the sign of this term is given by the sign of d logRad logm + Rr, where
Ra and Rr are the coeﬃcients of absolute and relative risk aversion for uncertainty regarding
full income m. Decreasing absolute risk aversion and a not too large Rr is thus suﬃcient for
concavity of bdH(c).
10Evaluating (4.1) at c1 = cd, noting that v(0, 0, aH) = v(bsH(c
s), 0, aH) and using the alterna-
tive formulation for the rhs, we get that 2v(bsH(c
s), 0, aH) = v(b
s
H(c
d), 0, aH) + v(b
s
H(0), 0, aH).
Since bsH(c) is decreasing and concave in c, and v(b, 0, aH) increasing and strictly concave in
b, it follows that cd < 2cs.
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Clearly, if b1H and c
1are suﬃciently low an H-person may prefer to mimic the
poor even though the WA knows this (so γ2 = γ1) . The condition for a pooling
equilibrium is given by the inequality
v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, aH
¢
+ v
¡
βH(γ
1), 0, aH
¢ ≥ v ¡b1H , 0, aH¢+ v (0, 0, aH) .
The upper boundary for pooling depends on the value γ1 takes. If γ1 ≥ γs
mimicking in the first period generates a welfare policy in the second period and
a monetary rent βH(γ
1) = bsH(0). In this case we can easily see that the upper
boundary of the pooling equilibrium coincides with the lower boundary of the
separating equilibrium (since by definition v (bsH(0), 0, aH) = v (bL(0), 0, aH)). If
on the other hand γ1 < γs, we know that βH(γ
1) = 0 and we can see that pooling
occurs when v (bL(c1), c1, aH) ≥ v (b1H , 0, aH), which with equality is the equation
for separation in the one period static case—eq (2.1).
Semi-Separating equilibrium
The third kind of equilibrium requires the following set of inequalities to be
fulfilled:
v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, aH
¢
+ v (bsH(0), 0, aH) > v(b
1
H , 0, aH) + v (0, 0, aH)
> v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, aH
¢
+ v
¡
βH(γ
1), 0, aH
¢
.
The lhs is H’s utility when mimicking as L when the WA believes everybody
is of type L (γ2 = 1), while the rhs is utility under mimicking when the WA
sets γ2 = γ1. A necessary condition for this series of inequalities to hold is of
course that γ1 < γs, since βH(γ
1) = bsH(0) if γ
1 ≥ γs. Suppose then that γ1 < γs.
Then we claim that there exists a semi-separating equilibrium in which an H-
person chooses the program intended for him (he does not register as poor) with
probability
µSS
def
=
γs − γ1
(1− γ1) γs , (4.2)
and the WA chooses a zero work requirement in the second period (i.e. c2 = 0)
with probability
qSS(b1H , c
1)
def
=
[v (b1H , 0, aH)− v (bL(c1), c1, aH)]
[v (bsH(0), 0, aH)− v (0, 0, aH)]
. (4.3)
To understand this claim, note that if H mimics with probability µ, the WA
will rationally believe that among those who opted for poverty transfers in the
first period a fraction γs are genuinely poor. With such a belief, the WA is
indiﬀerent between a workfare and a welfare program in the second period, and
therefore willing to randomize between these two policies. A simple computation
shows that she must randomize with probability qSS(b1H , c
1) in order to make
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H indiﬀerent between pooling with L-individuals and separating.11 The semi-
separation equilibrium is depicted in the middle part of figure 3 below.
Let us summarize the facts we have established so far.
Proposition 1 Depending on the value of γ1, the following equilibria exist:
For γ1 < γs :
(i) separating equilibrium. H and L are separated in the first period, and a
type contingent welfare policy is implemented in the second period; (b1H , c
1) satisfy
b1H ≥ bdH(c1), 0 ≤ c1 ≤ min{cd, cmax};
(ii) semi-separating equilibrium. H and L are partly separated in the first
period, and WA chooses randomly between welfare and workfare in the second
period; (b1H , c
1) satisfy bsH(c
1) ≤ b1H < bdH(c1), 0 ≤ c1 ≤ min{cd, cmax}; and
(iii) pooling equilibrium. H and L are not separated in the first period, and
a separating workfare program is oﬀered in the second period; (b1H , c
1) satisfy
0 ≤ b1H ≤ bsH(c1), 0 ≤ c1 ≤ cs.
For γ1 ≥ γs :
(i) separating equilibrium. H and L are separated in the first period, and a
type contingent welfare policy is implemented in the second period; (b1H , c
1) satisfy
b1H ≥ bdH(c1), 0 ≤ c1 ≤ min{cd, cmax}; and
(ii) pooling equilibrium. H and L are not separated, and universal welfare
is oﬀered in the second period; (b1H , c
1) satisfies 0 ≤ b1H < bdH(c1), 0 ≤ c1 ≤
min{cd, cmax}.
These diﬀerent equilibria are depicted in figure 3 (for the case where cs <
cd < cco < cmax).
Insert figure 3 here.
4.2 Optimal poverty alleviation programs
Now that we have outlined the continuation equilibrium for each first period
program (b1H , c
1), we have enough information to characterize the cost minimizing
first period program. The first period policy is made up of two instruments: c1
hours of work requirement on L-persons, and the cash transfer b1H to H-persons.
In terms of first period resources, it is costly to use both instruments, but on the
11H’s utility when pooling and separating are v(bL(c1), c1, aH) + (1 − q)v(bL(cs), cs, aH) +
qv(bL(0), 0, aH) and v(b1H , 0, aH)+v(0, 0, aH), respectively. Since v(bL(c
s), cs, aH) = v(0, 0, aH)
and v(bL(0), 0, aH) = v(bsH(0), 0, aH), (4.3) follows.
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other hand, an appropriate use of these instruments can make it more eﬃcient
to target transfers to the long term poor and to economize on second period
transfers. When H-persons separate in the first period with probability µ, the
cost of the program in that period is
K1(c1, b1H , µ)
def
= [γ1 + (1− γ1)(1− µ)]bL(c1) + (1− γ1)µb1H . (4.4)
The first square brackets term denotes the number of persons displaying type
L behavior: the really needy and the fraction of H-persons pretending to be
needy. The second term gives the amount of transfers handed over to those
H-persons who reveal themselves as non-needy. Since both instruments c1 and
b1H give rise to first period costs, it will be eﬃcient to select them on the lower
boundary of each regime. Thus, if separation (µ = 1) is aimed at, the WA
should set b1H = b
d
H(c
1) and c1 ≤ min{cd, cmax}. Likewise, a minimal eﬃciency
requirement for inducing semi-separation is that b1H = b
s
H(c
1). And if pooling is
intended (µ = 0), costs are minimized when b1H = 0 and c
1 = 0.
We then turn to second period costs. If the WA randomizes and chooses a
welfare policy with probability q in the second period, the expected costs are
given by
EK2(µ, q) def= γ1[(1− q)bL(cs) + qbL(0)] (4.5)
+ (1− γ1)(1− µ)[(1− q) · 0 + qbsH(0)],
where (µ, q) take on the values (1,1) under separation and type-contingent welfare
policy, (µ, qSS(b1H , c
1)) under semi-separation and a random policy, (0, 0) under
pooling and workfare (if γ1 < γs), and (0, 1) under pooling and welfare (if γ1 ≥
γs). In this expression, the first square bracket term is the expected transfer
which will be handed over to L-persons, while the second square bracket term
is the expected amount of money that will be transferred to every H-person
that pooled in the first period with the L -types (those H-persons that revealed
themselves in the first period—a fraction (1− γ1)π—receive no transfer at all).
With generic cost functions given by (4.4) and (4.5), we can start inquiring
about the kind of equilibrium that ought to be established in the first period,
and how that equilibrium should be implemented. We first address the latter
question for the separating equilibrium. Next, we compare the minimal costs
under separation with the minimal cost of a pooling and semi-separation program
(should this last program be relevant).
Assume that the WA has decided to induce a separating equilibrium. When
is it optimal to rely on a work requirement to screen the two types? Obviously,
the answer depends on how large the fraction of potential fraudulent claimants
(H-persons) is. Just as for the static case, welfare will be optimal when γ1 is
close to one, and workfare will be optimal when γ1 is close to zero. To find out
when it becomes eﬃcient to switch from workfare to welfare, we equate the first
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period costs under workfare, K1(min{cd, cmax}, 0, 1), with those under welfare,
K1(0, bdH(0), 1) and solve for the a priori belief γ
1:
γd
def
=
[bdH(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})]
[bdH(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})] + [bL(min{cd, cmax})− bL(0)]
. (4.6)
This leads to
Lemma 3 A separating equilibrium with a work requirement min{cd, cmax} is less
costly than a separating equilibrium with welfare if and only if γ1 < γd.
Since bdH(0) > 2b
s
H(0) and min{cd, cmax} ≤ cd < 2cs it follows that γd >
γs (compare equations (3.1) and (4.6)). Hence, a WA who runs a two-period
program strictly prefers a workfare policy if γ1 = γs. This implies that a workfare
program is cost eﬀective for a wider range of prior beliefs in a dynamic context.
Also note that for a given level of cd, γd is bigger when cd < cmax than when
cd > cmax — intuitively, when you have to leave some rent to H when using
workfare, you will resort to that instrument ’less often’.
Let us now compare the minimal costs under separating equilibrium with
those under the other types of equilibria. First, consider the case where γ1 < γs.
The expected second period costs in a semi-separating equilibrium is γ1bL(cs),
which is precisely the expected second period cost under pooling (a WA who
has learned nothing from the first period implements a workfare program in the
second period when γ1 < γs).12 On the other hand, the minimal first period cost
under pooling is bL(0), while it is
γ1
γs
bL(c
1)+(1− γ1
γs
)bsH(c
1) under semi-separation.
Since bsH(0) = bL(0) and b
s
H(c) is decreasing in c, the minimal first period cost
under semi-separation is always below the corresponding cost under pooling. This
proves
Lemma 4 Suppose γ1 < γs. Then any semi-separation equilibrium with a first
period policy (c1, bsH(c
1)), c1 ∈ [0, cs] is less costly than any first period policy
resulting in a pooling equilibrium using the same work requirement.
Thus, when γ1 < γs it suﬃces to compare the most eﬃcient policies yield-
ing semi-separation with the workfare policy leading to full separation. In the
appendix we prove
Lemma 5 Suppose γ1 < γs. Then there exists a critical level of γ1 given by
γSS
def
=
bdH(min{cd, cmax})
bdH(min{cd, cmax}) + (1 + 1γs )bL(cs)− z − bL(0)
such that the cost eﬃcient policy is separation with work requirementmin{cd, cmax}
iﬀ γ1 > γSS ,and semi-separation with work requirement cs otherwise.
12Recall that a semi-separating equilibrium can only occur when γ1 < γs. The expected cost
under semi-separation is given by (4.5) with µ = µSS (defined in (4.2)). Making use of (3.1),
this reduces to γ1bL(cs), whatever value q takes.
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For cd < cmax we have bdH(min{cd, cmax}) = 0 and γSS = 0; a separating policy
with work requirement cd costs less than a semi-separating policy for any a priori
beliefs γ1 < γs. For cd > cmax we have bdH(min{cd, cmax}) > 0 and γSS > 0; a
semi-separating policy with a work requirement cs in both periods costs less than
a separating policy with cmax for small values of γ1.
To explain the last case, note that full separation with maximal use of work
requirements implies some rents to the non-poor. This policy is relatively costly
if there are many non-poor around (if γ1 is low). On the other hand, there exists
a semi-separating equilibrium where a work requirement cs is imposed in both
periods. To see this, note that if fewer than (1−γ1)µSS of the non-poor separate
in the first period, it is optimal for the WA to impose a work requirement cs in
the second period, and a first period work requirement cs is suﬃcient to make
the non-poor indiﬀerent between separation and mimicking. There thus exist
an equilibrium with semi-separation that leaves no rents to the non-poor, but
imposes a higher total work requirement (cs + cs) on the poor. If γ1 is low the
dominant concern becomes to reduce the transfers—the rent—given to the non-poor
as much as possible. It is exactly in these circumstances that a semi-separating
policy is cost eﬀective.
Let us now consider the optimal first period policy when the WA’s prior
beliefs belong to the range [γs, 1]. We know that a semi-separation equilibrium
can never obtain with such beliefs. We also know that the optimal separation
policy is one based on welfare whenever γ1 ∈ [γd, 1]. This policy gives rise to a
total cost of γ1bL(0)+(1−γ1)bdH(0)+ γ1bL(0). The total cost of the most eﬃcient
pooling policy amounts to bL(0)+ γ1bL(0)+(1−γ1)bsH(0). Comparing these costs
it follows that separation with welfare costs less than pooling if and only if
bdH(0)− 2bsH(0) < bL(0)− bsH(0). (4.7)
The lhs of (4.7) can be interpreted as the cost of not being able to smooth out
the transfers to H-persons when separating them from the needy. The rhs stands
for the static gain when separating with welfare: if H is not separated from L,
the former gets bL(0), while under separation with welfare they get bsH(0). So
the long term cost of non-smoothing has to fall short of the short term gain of
separation for separation to be optimal. But since bL(0) = bsH(0), (4.7) will always
be violated, and we can conclude that it will never pay to try to separate the two
types with a welfare policy in a long-term poverty model.
With (4.7) violated, pooling will dominate separation with welfare for all
γ1 ∈ [γd, 1]. But for γ1 = γd, we know that a separating equilibrium with welfare
costs exactly as much as a separating equilibrium with workfare. This means that
the latter policy will also be dominated by pooling for some beliefs γ1 below γd.
Solving for the belief γ1 which equates the cost of pooling (bL(0)+γ1bL(0)+ (1−
γ1)bsH(0)) with the total cost of separation with workfare (γ
1bL(min{cd, cmax}) +
γ1bL(0) + (1− γ1)bdH(min{cd, cmax})) yields
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γdp
def
=
2bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
bL(min{cd, cmax}) + bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
, (4.8)
which can be shown to be smaller than γd but larger than γs.13 We summarize
this finding as
Lemma 6 Suppose γ1 > γs. Then, for all γ1 ∈ [γs, γdp], the total expected cost
of the most eﬃcient workfare policy inducing separation is smaller than the total
expected cost of a welfare policy inducing pooling. For all γ1 ∈ [γdp, 1], the total
expected cost of a welfare policy inducing pooling is smaller than the total expected
cost of the most eﬃcient policy inducing separation.
Lemma 6 then leads to our second proposition (illustrated in Figure 4):
Proposition 2 If γ1 > γdp the most eﬃcient policy is welfare inducing pooling.
If γ1 < γdp and cd < cmax, the most eﬃcient policy is workfare cd inducing
separation. However, if cd > cmax, for a small range of a priori beliefs γ1 ∈
[0, γSS] (γSS < γdp) the most eﬃcient policy is semi-separation with workfare cs.
Insert figure 4 here.
Proposition 2 highlights that workfare should be used ’more often’ in the
first period of a long term poverty alleviation problem, than under short term
poverty alleviation. Once people have been screened, however, workfare has no
role to play; second period transfers are made categorical, a cash transfer to the
identified L-persons, nothing to the others. The other alternative, which then
is used less often, is the universal welfare policy: a welfare grant bL(0) is handed
out unconditionally, to any person who applies for it. In a short term poverty
problem, this is the optimal policy for γ1 > γs. In the long term problem,
γ1 must exceed γdp for this to be the eﬃcient policy. The WA does not learn
anything about applicants’ types in this case and enters the second period as
uninformed as she was in the first. Because γdp > γs , she continues in the
second period to hand out a welfare grant bL(0) to anybody who asks for it. Put
diﬀerently, universal welfare is a stationary optimal policy. Finally, there is the
possibility that the voluntary participation condition on the poor prevents using
a high work requirement (cd > cmax). For low values of γ1, the eﬃcient policy
is partial-separating. TheWA imposes a work requirement cs in the first period.
Less than (1−γ1)µSS of the non-poor separate which makes it optimal to impose
a work requirement of cs also in the second period. Thus, partial-separation
implies a stationary policy with a work requirement cs in each period.
13For cd < cmax, these statements are easy to verify. For cd > cmax, they build on the proofs
in part 2 of lemma 5.
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5 Dynamics with moral hazard: poverty reduc-
ing eﬀort
In this section we consider the possibility that a person with an income potential
aL in the first period can escape poverty and achieve productivity aH in the
second period. More specifically, let π ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that an L-
person continues to have low productivity in the second period, and (1− π) the
probability that he obtains productivity aH in period two. In what follows, we
will refer to these figures respectively as fail probability and escape probability. A
poor person can exert eﬀort e in period 1 to reduce the fail probability. Hence,
the design of poverty alleviation programs, the choice between a workfare or a
welfare program, can aﬀect π in two diﬀerent ways. First, the amount of public
work required in the first period may have a direct eﬀect on π. Second, the
amount of public work required in the second period may influence π indirectly,
by changing the poor’s incentives to exert poverty reducing eﬀort.
We ignore the direct eﬀects, primarily because it is straightforward to under-
stand how they alter benefits and costs of diﬀerent poverty alleviation programs.
If first period work requirements have a direct positive eﬀect on the poor’s escape
probability, for example by providing on-the-job training, this increases the at-
tractiveness of using workfare in the first period. These eﬀects are straightforward
to understand. Instead, we focus on the indirect eﬀect, i.e. on how the choice of
second period poverty alleviation program aﬀects a poor person’s incentives to
exert poverty reducing eﬀort in the first period.
The incentive to undertake poverty reducing eﬀort, PRE for short, in the
first period stems from the diﬀerence in expected utility levels of having high-
and low- ability in the second period. This diﬀerence depends on the program
that is implemented in the second period. Let (c, 1− q) denote a second period
policy in which a workfare program with work requirement c is implemented with
probability 1 − q in the second period. The expected utility diﬀerence is given
by,
∆(c, 1− q) = [(1− q) v(bsH(c), 0, aH) + qv(bsH(0), 0, aH ]−
[(1− q) v(bL(c), c, aL) + qv((bL(0), 0, aL)] > 0 (5.1)
The first term measures expected second period utility for a high ability person
if the WA imposes a work requirement c with probability (1− q) and zero work
requirement with probability q. The second term gives the expected utility corre-
sponding to a poor person. The fail probability function is given by π(e), where
π(0) = 1, π0(e) < 0, π00(e) > 0 and π0(0) = −∞. To get an interesting problem
we assume that the WA cannot observe individual poverty reducing eﬀort—it is
therefore impossible to oﬀer eﬀort contingent transfers.
With eﬀort measured in disutility units, the poor exert eﬀort to maximize
(1−π(e))∆(c, 1− q)− e. Under our assumptions on π(·), the optimal eﬀort level,
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e∗, satisfies the first order condition
−π0(e∗)∆(c, 1− q) = 1. (5.2)
Slightly abusing notation, we write from now on π(∆(c, 1 − q)) as the fail
probability when eﬀort is chosen according to (5.2).
Totally diﬀerentiating (5.2) gives
de∗
dq
=
(−π0(e∗))2
π00(e∗)
∆q (5.3)
where
∆q
def
=
∂∆
∂q
= [v(bsH(0), 0, aH)− v(0, 0, aH)]−
[v(bL(0), 0, aL)− v(bL(cs), cs, aL)] . (5.4)
The first square bracket term in (5.4) is strictly positive: a high ability per-
son strictly prefers a welfare program. What about the second square bracket
term? Suppose that with the work requirement cs (the maximal work require-
ment which brings H on the reservation utility when posing as L), the L-person
still participates in the private labour market. Then by construction, the latter’s
full income is still equal to z and L is indiﬀerent between workfare or welfare so
that the second square bracket term vanishes. We regard this as the benchmark
case and formulate it as
Assumption NCO (no crowding out): cs < cco.
Thus underNCO, a higher probability of welfare in period 2 triggers a higher
PRE by an L-person in period 1. Welfare in the second period has a carrot eﬀect.
The reaction curve of L’s eﬀort (or the associated fail probability π) w.r.t. q is
thus as in figure 5.
Insert figure 5 here.
If NCO does not hold, an L-person is strictly worse oﬀ under a workfare
than under a welfare program. L’s disposable income is still z, but the work
requirement cs exceeds cco which is the amount L would choose to work in a
welfare program. Put diﬀerently, a workfare program becomes a stick that
reduces the utility of a poor person if cs exceeds cco. As long as cs only slightly
exceeds cco the carrot of getting a welfare transfer as non-poor dominates, which
means that PRE increases in q. If, however, cs becomes substantially larger than
cco things change. The prospect of remaining a poor individual on a workfare
program in period 2 becomes now so bleak that PRE decreases in q.
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To illuminate this argument it is helpful to note that∆(c, 1−q) can be written
as q∆(0, 0) + (1 − q)∆(c, 1) and the derivative of the utility diﬀerential is thus
simply ∆(0, 0)−∆(c, 1). It is easy to see that ∆(c, 1− q) (and therefore PRE)
is maximized at q = 1 as long as ∆(0, 0) > ∆(c, 1). We know that this strict
inequality holds for all c ≤ cco. In fact, denoting by bc the work requirement that
solves ∆(0, 0) = ∆(c, 1), it is easy to check that cco < bc < cmax.14 We conclude
that a welfare program maximizes PRE as long as the workfare program has a
work requirement lower than bc. For a work requirement in the interval [bc, cmax]
PRE is maximized by choosing q = 0, that is, by implementing a workfare
program. We return to this deterrence argument in favor of workfare later when
comparing our result to that of Besley & Coate (1992), but for the moment we
assume that NCO holds. Note, however, that all results in the next section hold
true for c < bc.
5.1 Equilibria with PRE
In this section we describe the three types of continuation equilibria when L
exerts PRE. The reader is referred to figure 6 below.
Separating equilibrium
Suppose the WA implements a program that separates the poor from the non-
poor in the first period. The portion of the poor that stays poor in the second
period, is given by π(∆(cs, 1− q)). A Bayesian welfare administrator infers that
a fraction γ2 = π(∆(cs, 1−q)) of those who signed up for the program in the first
period are genuinely poor in the second period. Depending on the magnitude of
π(∆(cs, 1− q)) these beliefs generate three diﬀerent second period programs:
π(∆(cs, 1− q)) < γs → workfare;
π(∆(cs, 1− q)) = γs → workfare or welfare (the WA is indiﬀerent);
π(∆(cs, 1− q)) > γs → welfare.
We assume now that PRE is neither too productive (A1) nor too unproductive
(A2):
Assumption A1 : π(∆(cs, 1)) > γs,
Assumption A2 : π(∆(0, 0)) < γs.
Assumption A1 ensures that the eﬀort level a poor person exerts when the
chance of obtaining as non-poor a zero information rent is too low to bring the
14∆q(cmax, 1− q) = [v(bL(0), 0, aH)− v(bL(0), 0, aL)]− [v(0, 0, aH)− v(0, 0, aL] =R aH
aL
∂
∂a [v(bL(0), 0, a)−v(0, 0, a)]da =
R aH
aL
[vb(bL(0), 0, a)L(bL(0), 0, a)−vb(0, 0, a)L(0, 0, a)]da.
Decreasing marginal utility of income and normality of leisure guarantees this to be positive.
Since ∆q(c, 1 − q) is continuous in c, this means that there exists a bc ∈ [0, cmax] such that
∆q(bc, 1− q) = 0.
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fail probability below γs. A1 guarantees that L’s reaction curve crosses the
horizontal axis to the right of γs. A2 ensures that when the odds for obtaining a
rent when leaving the poverty status are maximal, the eﬀort level exerted is high
enough to bring the fail probability below γs. A2 is invoked to get an interesting
situation. If it did not hold there would only exist a separating equilibrium in
which the WA imposes welfare with probability one in the second period. We
have already analyzed this case in the preceding section.
Assumptions A1 and A2 thus imply that there exists a separating policy in
the first period if and only if theWA chooses a work requirement cs in the second
period with probability 1− qS, such that
π(∆(cs, 1− qS)) = γs. (5.5)
The minimal transfer that for a first period work requirement c1 induces
separation in the first period, Bd(c1), is defined by15
v(BdH(c
1), 0, aH) + v(0, 0, aH) = v(bL(c
1), c1, aH) (5.6)
+qSv(bL(0), 0, aH) + (1− qS)v(0, 0, aH).
BdH(c
1) is, for the same reason as bdH(c
1), decreasing and concave in c1. Define
the work requirement Cd as BdH(C
d) = 0. Comparing (5.6) with equation (4.1)
in the preceding section, we may conclude that BdH(c
1) < bdH(c
1) for all values of
c1, and hence that Cd < cd.
PRE implies workfare with a positive probability in the second period. This
has two implications. The first is that separation in the first period is made
easier: PRE allocates some work requirements in the second period; this reduces
the rent of H-people in that period and makes it easier to convince H-people
to reveal their identity in period 1. A second implication is that the poors’
incentives to exert poverty reducing eﬀort is weakened, compared to what their
eﬀort would be if the WA could commit to a welfare program with probability 1
in the second period. This is clear from L’s reaction curve in figure 5.
Pooling equilibrium
Suppose the welfare program induces pooling in the first period. Rational
second period beliefs entail γ2 = γ1π(∆(cs, 1 − q)). Again, depending of the
magnitude of π(∆(cs, 1− q)), these beliefs generate three diﬀerent programs for
the second period:
γ1π(∆(cs, 1− q)) < γs → workfare;
γ1π(∆(cs, 1− q)) = γs → indiﬀerence between workfare or welfare;
γ1π(∆(cs, 1− q)) > γs → welfare.
If γ1 < γs the number of genuinely needy in period 2, γ1π(∆(cs, 1− q)), falls
short of γs, whatever the level of PRE. TheWA will thus rely on workfare with
15Capital letters represent variables and functions when the poor can undertake PRE.
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probability 1 in that period, and L-people will exert the minimal eﬀort level emin.
On the other hand, if γ1 > γs, the only equilibrium is where the poor choose
through their eﬀort level a fail probability γs/γ1, and the WA chooses a welfare
programme with probability qP as defined by
γ1π(∆(cs, 1− qP )) = γs. (5.7)
Note that qP < qS because γs/γ1 > γs.
The condition for a pooling equilibrium is given by
v(b1H , 0, aH) + v(0, 0, aH) ≤
v(bL(c
1), c1, aH) + q
Pv(bL(0), 0, aH) +
¡
1− qP ¢ v(0, 0, aH).
The upper boundary for a pooling equilibrium is given by the first period
transfer that makes this inequality bind; it is denoted BdPH (c
1). If γ1 < γs,
implying qP = 0, the upper boundary corresponds with the transfer that in-
duces separation in the static case bsH(c
1). If γ1 > γs (and thus 0 < qP < qS)
the upper boundary of pooling satisfies the inequalities, bsH(c
1) < BdPH (c
1) <
BdH(c
1)(< bdH(c
1)). Note that the upper boundary of pooling always lies strictly
below the lower boundary of separation. This indicates that also for γ1 > γs,
semi-separation equilibria may occur. (In the preceding section without poverty
reducing investments this was not the case.) We now turn to this type of equi-
libria.
Semi-Separation.
If the non-poor choose to separate from the poor with probability µ ∈ (0, 1)
in the first period, and the poor exert eﬀort that leads to a fail probability π,
Bayesian updating leads to second period beliefs
γ2 =
γ1π
γ1 + (1− γ1) (1− µ) . (5.8)
In a semi-separating equilibrium the non-poor are indiﬀerent between mimick-
ing the poor or separating from them in the first period. To make H-individuals
indiﬀerent the WA must choose a welfare program in the second period with
probability
qSS(b1H , c
1) =
v [b1H , 0, aH ]− v [bsH(c1), 0, aH)]
v [bsH , 0, aH ]− v [0, 0, aH)]
, (5.9)
which is the same expression as (4.3). With q being given by qSS, L’s optimal
eﬀort choice leads to a fail probability πSS given by
πSS = π(∆(cs, 1− qSS)). (5.10)
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We can then solve for the equilibrium value of µ. This is given by the fact that
γ2 must be equal to γs to make the WA willing to randomize between workfare
and welfare in the second period. Employing (5.8), we get that
MSS =
γs − γ1πSS
(1− γ1)γs , (5.11)
which may be compared with µSS defined in (4.2).
In order to have a semi-separating equilibrium, that is, in order to have 0 <
MSS < 1, it must be the case that γs < πSS < min{1, γs/γ1}. Two situations
may occur. The first is when γs/γ1 > 1 and the relevant interval for πSS is
[γs, 1]. If b1H → bsH(c1), qSS → 0 and πSS → π(emin). In that case, the lower
boundary of the SS region corresponds to the upper boundary of the pooling
region (when γs > γ1). On the other hand, if b1H → BdH(c1), then from (5.9) it
follows that qSS → qS (see (5.5)), and πSS → γs. The upper boundary for the
semi-separation region is therefore BdH(c
1). The other case is where γs/γ1 < 1,
so that πSS must belong to the interval [γs, γs/γ1]. Again it easy to verify that
the upper and lower boundary of semi-separation corresponds to the boundaries
of separation and pooling respectively.16
Summary
Introducing PRE modifies the type and existence of the equilibria in several
ways. We emphasize two observations. First, PRE makes it easier to separate the
poor from the non-poor at the beginning of the program. With PRE, separation
in the first period implies workfare with probability qs > 0 in the second period.
This makes it less tempting for H-individuals to mimic L-individuals, imply-
ing, BdH(c
1) < bdH(c
1) for all c1. Second, PRE implies that there exists a semi-
separating equilibrium for all values of γ1, while, when such eﬀort is to no avail,
there exists a semi-separating equilibrium only if γ1 > γs. Without PRE and
γ1 < γs, pooling in the first period implies workfare with probability one in the
second period. The upper boundary of pooling coincides therefore with the lower
boundary of separation and makes no room for semi-separation. With PRE, we
have seen that pooling in the first period implies workfare with probability qP
in the second period, while separation in the first period implies workfare with
probability qS in the second. Since qP is strictly lower than qS, there is room for
a semi-separating equilibrium.
Insert figure 6 here
16If b1H → BdPH (c1), qSS → qP and πSS → γs/γ1. The lower boundary of the SS region
is thus given by BdPH (c
1) (the upper boundary of the pooling region (when γs < γ1). That
the upper boundary for the semi-separation region is given by BdH(c
1), follows from the same
argument as in the text.
25
5.2 Selection of programs
How does poverty reducing eﬀort influence the choice among first period pro-
grams? We will confine ourselves to discuss the choice among separating pro-
grams, and therefore this question narrows down to: does poverty reducing eﬀort
increase or reduce the value of using a work requirement to screen the non-poor
from the poor?
Whether theWA uses workfare or welfare to separate, second period costs are
identical and equal to γ1bL(0).17 First period costs amount to γ1bL(min{Cd, cmax})+
(1 − γ1)BdH(min{Cd, cmax}) under workfare and γ1bL(0) + (1 − γ1)BdH(0) under
welfare. The critical value for γ1 is therefore
Gd
def
=
BdH(0)−BdH(min{Cd, cmax})
BdH(0)−BdH(min{Cd, cmax}) + bL(min{Cd, cmax})− bL(0)
.
Since PRE implies workfare with a positive probability in the second period,
it becomes easier to separate the poor from the non-poor in the first period, both
with workfare and welfare: Cd < cd and Bd(0) < bd(0). To assess whether
workfare as a screening instrument becomes more costly relative to welfare, we
must compare the cost reduction aL
¡
cd − Cd¢ with bd(0)−Bd(0). Both magni-
tudes are determined by the shape of the utility function. Decreasing marginal
utility of income makes the diﬀerence bd(0)−Bd(0) relatively large, and the fact
that v(bL(c), c, aH) utility is decreasing but concave in c makes the diﬀerence
aL
¡
cd − Cd¢ relatively small. This then implies bd(0) − Bd(0) > aL ¡cd − Cd¢;
workfare is used less often when the poor can exert PRE. Formally we have
Proposition 3 Gd < γd.
(The proof is in the appendix.)
Workfare is thus used less often when PRE can be exerted. It is also clear
that the total cost of the most eﬃcient separating programme is lower under PRE.
As mentioned earlier, second period costs are γ1bL(0). This was also the case in
section 4. However, we also argued earlier that PRE makes makes it easier for
the WA to separate the two types in period 1: when welfare is used, H’s carrot
is BdH(0) rather than b
d
H(0), and when workfare is used, C
d hours suﬃce (in stead
of cd). An eﬃcient WA’s costs thus behave as in figure 7 (for cd < cmax).
Insert firgure 7 here.
17Expected second period costs are γ1
¡
γs[qSbL(0) + (1− qS)bL(cs)] + (1− γs)[qSbsH(0) + (1− qS)0]
¢
.
They can be rearranged as γ1[qSbL(0)+γs(1−qS)bL(cs)], or simply γ1bL(0) (since γs = bL(0)bL(cs)).
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6 Optimal policy under commitment
So far we have analyzed the costs of diﬀerent transfer programs assuming that
the WA cannot commit to a future program. We have assumed she implements
the second period policy that minimizes costs, given the information she has at
that stage. What we do next is to characterize the optimal commitment policy
and verify how it diﬀers from the time consistent policy when the WA cannot
commit. Our discussion is organized as in the no-commitment case; first we
address the screening problem, subsequently we increase complexity and include
the possibility that the poor can undertake poverty reducing investments.
6.1 Screening and commitment
The ”no commitment” assumption prevents a separating policy program from
specifying any work requirements or transfers to H−individuals in the second
period. Formally, separation and sequential rationality imply c2 = 0 and b2H = 0.
Repeating the static program is therefore impossible for a WA who operates a
program that runs over two periods. Does this constraint increase the overall
costs of poverty alleviation? Based on what we know about dynamic screening
problems in general, we might expect lack of commitment to be a burden—see e.g.
Laﬀont & Tirole (1990).
The fact is, however, that lack of commitment causes no additional screening
costs as long as separation by workfare is the cost minimizing policy and cd <
cmax. If the WA imposes a work requirement cd in the first period and a zero
requirement in the second, we know that she is able to separate the two types.
The total cost of separating this way is γ1[bL(cd) + bL(0)]. On the other hand,
if she implements twice the optimal static workfare policy, she is also able to
separate the two types, but at a total cost of γ1[bL(cs) + bL(cs)]. We know that
cd < 2cs and since bL(c) is concave in c, it is optimal to impose work requirements
only in one period. Hence, even if the WA could commit to a future policy, and
therefore could choose c2 > 0, she would be better oﬀ choosing c1 = cd and
c2 = 0.18
On the other hand, it is clear that lack of commitment is a potential problem
if cd > cmax. To see this, suppose a large share of the target population is non-
poor (γ1 is low). In this case it is clearly optimal to use work requirements as
much as possible, to constrain the rent of the non-poor. The problem is that
even a maximal work requirement in the first period, the maximum being given
by the participation constraint of the poor, implies some rents to the non-poor.
18It is worth mentioning that relaxing the assumption of constant productivity (normalized to
zero) in the public sector, may change this conclusion. To see why, assume that the marginal
productivity of public work is decreasing in c. This would obviously make an argument for
smoothing total work requirement over time. If this eﬀect is strong enough it could counterweigh
the concavity of the transfer function and make lack of commitment costly.
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If the WA could commit to a second period program she would be better oﬀ
implementing a PAP program with work requirements cs in both periods, and
achieve complete separation without handing out any transfers to the non-poor.
6.2 PRE and commitment
Let us finally focus on the optimal policy for providing the poor with incentives
to exert poverty reducing eﬀort. This is what Besley and Coate (1992) do in
section IV of their paper. They assume the WA can observe each individual’s
income potential (ability), an assumption that makes workfare redundant as a
screening device, since there is no screening problem when ability is observable.
Workfare can nevertheless be a useful policy instrument because it can function
as a stick to give the poor incentives to undertake poverty reducing eﬀort. Besley
and Coate (1992) call this the deterrent argument in favor of workfare. They
show that the cost minimizing PAP either imposes no work requirement at all
(leaving L with a utility level v(bL(0), 0, aL) > v(0, 0, aL), or the maximal work
requirement cmax that brings L on his reservation utility level.
It is easy to understand why workfare can be used to stimulate PRE. By
imposing the maximal work requirement cmax on the poor one reduces their util-
ity as much as possible, given voluntary participation and the constraint that
everyone must receive a minimum income z. This policy makes the prospect of
staying poor very bleak, and gives those with a low income potential in the first
period strong incentives to make an eﬀort to increase their income potential in
the second period.
Besley and Coate (1992) do not present an explicit dynamic model to address
the incentive problems associated with multi period transfer programs. In the
section where they address the deterrent argument in favor of workfare, they
include, heuristically, a pre-program stage where L-individuals can exert PRE.
They take it for granted that the WA can commit herself—before the poor choose
the level of PRE—to very high work requirements on those who are poor in the
future. The commitment assumption is not stated explicitly in their paper, but is
essential. Ex post, it is obviously not optimal to impose a poverty requirement on
the poor. The cost minimizing program ex post, given that there is no screening
problem present, is to implement a type contingent welfare policy: a transfer
bL(0) to the L-individuals, and nothing to H−individuals.
Consider then our two period model and assume that the WA has imple-
mented a first period program that separated the poor from the non poor. Ab-
stract from the original H-people — they have already revealed themselves. As-
sume now, as Besley and Coate (1992) do, that the WA can commit to a second
period program before the poor exert poverty reducing eﬀort. But contrary to
Besley and Coate, let us hold on to the assumption that the WA cannot observe
the income capacity of potential welfare claimants. This diﬀerence is important.
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In section IV of Besley and Coate (1992) the WA has only one objective: to
maximize PRE. In our set-up theWA has two concerns. In addition to give the
poor strong incentives to exert PRE, she must commit to a policy program that
is appropriate given the screening problem she faces in the second period. Two
concerns thus need to be balanced. Let us set up the expected cost for period 2:
EK2 = γ1{bL(c)π(∆(c, 1)) + bsH(c)[1− π(∆(c, 1))]}
where we remind the reader that∆(c, 1) is equal to v(bsH(c), 0, aH)−v(bL(c), c, aL).
Taking the derivative w.r.t. c yields
1
γ1
dEK2
dc
=
µ
dbL(c)
dc
π +
dbsH(c)
dc
(1− π)
¶
+
Ã
[bL(c)− bsH(c)]
dπ
d∆|{z} ∂∆(c, 1)∂c| {z }
!
(−) (−/0)
The first two terms inform about the marginal cost eﬀect of workfare as a
screening device. The last term measures its eﬀect as a deterrence device. Re-
garding the latter, we claim that ∂∆(c,1)
∂c
• < 0 for c ∈ [0,min{cco, cs}], because H’s utility falls;
• > 0 for c ∈ [max{cco, cs}, cmax], because L’s utility falls;
• = 0 for c ∈ [cs, cco] (if cs < cco);
• < 0 for c ∈ [cco, cs] (if cs > cco) because H’s utility falls more than L’s.19
Evaluating dEK
2
dc at c = 0, we obtain
20
1
γ1
dEK2
dc
|c=0 = aH
µ
π(∆(0, 1))− γs + aL
aH
[1− min{c
s, cco}
cs
]
¶
.
Since ∆(0, 1) = ∆(0, 0), this result shows that if PRE is not too productive
in the sense of assumption (A.2) second period costs may fall when setting the
work requirement marginally above zero. In fact, they will fall when cs < cco.
At the other extreme, when c approaches cmax, the screening eﬀect has disap-
peared (the derivatives of bL(c) and bsH(c) vanish from resp. c
co and cs onwards)
and the negative deterrence eﬀect remains. cmax is therefore a local minimum.
19 ∂∆(c,1)
∂c =
∂v(bsH(c),0,aH)
∂c − ∂v(bL(c),c,aL)∂c . If cco < c < cs, the rhs can also be written as
−vb(bsH(c), 0, aH)aH + u`(z, 1− c), or as u`(z, 1− c)− u`(bsH(c) + y∗, 1− y
∗
aH
), where y∗ is H’s
optimal choice of private earnings.
Since z < bsH(c) + y
∗ and c < y
∗
aH
, H’s marginal utility of leisure is larger than L’s. This
then means that ∂∆(c,1)∂c < 0.
20 1
γ1
dEK2
dc |c=0 = {aLπ(∆(0, 1))− (aH − aL)[1− π(∆(0, 1))]} = γ1aH{ aLaH − [1− π(∆(0, 1))]}
= γ1aH{π(∆(0, 1))−γs+ aLaH [1−
min{cs,cco}
cs ]}, where the last equality follows from the definition
of γs (cf (3.1)).
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Proposition 4 Suppose that the WA can commit to a second period program
before the poor make their eﬀort choice, but that she cannot observe people’s
ability outcome following that choice. If cs < cco, she should either commit to a
program with work requirement c∗ implicitly defined as
c∗ =
γs − π(∆(c∗, 1))
(− dπd∆)vb(bH(c∗), 0, aH)(aH − aL)
∈ (0, cs)
or to a program with the maximal work requirement cmax. If cs > cco, the same
conclusion holds, except when dEK
2
dc |c=0 > 0; then the choice is between a zero or
the maximal work requirement cmax.
(The proof is in the appendix.)
We have illustrated the shape of the cost function in the figure below for
cs < cco.
Insert figure 8 here.
In this figure, c∗ is the global minimum of the cost function. There exists of
course parameter values for which the global minimum is at cmax. This depends,
among other things, on the shape of the utility function and of π(·). Roughly, if
cmax generates a very high level of PRE, compared to c∗, it is optimal to impose
the maximal work requirement.
Note that the commitment assumption bites; the optimal policy is not time
consistent without commitment. If theWA could renege on the announced policy,
she would implement a work requirement cs, since this is the optimal screening
policy in the second period as long as π < γs.
It is well known that altruistic policy makers have a hard time making it
credible that they will use the stick and punish the poor unless they make a
serious eﬀort to escape poverty. Buchanen (1975) termed this the Samaritan’s
dilemma.21 The reason, though, why announcing a work requirement cmax for
the second period is not credible does not reflect the Samaritan’s dilemma. Our
policy maker, the WA, is not an altruist; the poor’s utility does not enter her
welfare function. Her concern is to ensure in the cheapest way that nobody in
the society remains under the poverty line z. The reason why the WA reneges
on the announced policy is simply that a cmax policy is not the cost minimizing
poverty alleviation policy in the second period.
21Later, Bruce and Waldman (1991) and Coate (1995) have argued that the Samaritan’s
dilemma has important implications for the design of poverty alleviation programs.
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7 Concluding remarks
Two fundamental incentive issues arise in the alleviation of long term poverty:
(i) how can we prevent non-poor people from claiming benefits meant for the
poor? and (ii) how can we encourage the poor to invest in their future income
potential? In this paper, we have analysed the usefulness of work requirements
both as a screening and deterrence device.
First we looked at the screening problem. The WA can make it less tempting
for the non-poor to pose as poor in two diﬀerent ways. She can increase their
utility if they do not join the programme by handing out a carrot—a welfare
transfer to those who do not pose as poor. Alternatively, she can reduce their
utility when joining the program by threatening with a stick—a work requirement
levied on those who claim low ability. A central feature in a dynamic model
is that, unless the WA can commit to future policy, separation requires type
contingent transfers in the second period. That is, the use of either carrot or
stick, necessary to separate the poor from the non-poor, must be concentrated in
the first period. We have shown that this increases the eﬀectiveness of workfare
as a screening instrument. But there is one proviso to this conclusion: in some
cases the concentrated use of the stick in the first period goes over what the poor
can bear, and in order not to scare them away, the WA should spread its use
out over time and at the same time present the non-poor with a modest carrot.
Though this will no longer result in full separation, it is the best the WA can
achieve when the number of initially poor is ’small’.
Both the stick and the carrot are costly sorting instruments. In some cases, in
particular when the poor make up a large part of the population, sorting becomes
too costly. Then, theWA should just hand out a universal welfare grant in both
periods.
We have also added considerations of poverty deterrence to our model. There
are two ways to provide the initially poor with incentives to escape poverty, again
deserving the metaphor of carrot and stick. The carrot is the promise of a transfer
to those who do not pose as poor; this makes it more attractive to become non-
poor in the second period. The alternative is to threat with a very high work
requirement on the poor as a stick, making it less attractive to stay poor. We
have shown that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a two period model with both
screening and deterrence entails work requirements with a positive probability in
the second period. Furthermore we have shown that including the deterrence
problem implies that workfare will be used less often as a screening device in the
first period. Deterrence considerations thus warrant a substitution of early for
later work requirements. This substitution happens in a double sense: a lower
amount of work requirement imposed early, but also a lower threshold value (for
the a priori belief on the number of real poor) that triggers a welfare programme.
Finally, we discussed the optimal design of programs for alleviating long term
poverty when it is possible to commit to future policy. Our most interesting
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finding here is that it can be optimal to commit to some work requirement in the
second period (though a lower level than the one that separates the poor from
the non-poor).
Our model can be extended in several directions. One extension we feel worth-
while exploring in future research is to open up for the possibility that initially
non-poor persons experience a fall in their income potential below the poverty
line. Screening incentives then not only have to be balanced with those for ex-
erting poverty reducing eﬀort, but also with those for poverty avoiding eﬀort.
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A Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
The transfer function bsH(c) is implicitly defined as
v(bsH(c), 0, aH) ≡ v(bL(c), c, aH). (A.1)
As private earnings of H when mimicking can be freely chosen, equality of utility
levels is equivalent to equality of full incomes:
bsH(c) + aH = bL(c) + (1− c)aH (A.2)
Straightforward diﬀerentiation then gives the results. ¥
Proof of lemma 2
In the dynamic case, the transfer function is defined by the identity
v
¡
bdH(c
1), 0, aH
¢ ≡ v ¡bL(c1), c1, aH¢+D (A.3)
where D def= v (bL(0), 0, aH) − v (0, 0, aH). Using (A.1), implicit diﬀerentiation
gives
dbdH(c
1)
dc1
= −vb(b
s
H(c
1), 0, aH)
vb(bdH(c
1), 0, aH)
(aH − aL). (A.4)
Diﬀerentiating a second time and rearranging produces
d2bdH(c)
dc2
= −(vb(b
s
H(c
1), 0, aH))
2
vb(bdH(c
1), 0, aH)
×µ
vbb(b
d
H(c
1), 0, aH)
(vb(bdH(c
1), 0, aH))2
− vbb(b
s
H(c
1), 0, aH)
(vb(bsH(c
1), 0, aH))2
¶
(aH − aL),
or simply
d2bdH(c)
dc2
=
(vsb)
2
vdb
[
vsbb
(vdb )
2
− v
d
bb
(vdb )
2
]
dbsH(c
1)
dc1
. (A.5)
In signing the term v
s
bb
(vdb )
2 − v
d
bb
(vdb )
2 , we may make use of the fact that
d log vbb(m)
(vb(m))2
d logm
=
d log(−vbb(m)
vb(m)
)
d logm
+ (−vbb(m)
vb(m)
) ·m, (A.6)
where m is full real income. Since K > 0, first period full income is higher when
being honest than when mimicking as L. The first rhs term is the logarithmic
change in the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, and the second rhs term is the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. ¥
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Proof of lemma 5
The proof is divided up in three parts.
Part 1
Among all eﬃcient policies inducing a semi-separating equilibrium, workfare (cs)
is optimal iﬀ γ1 < (γs)2.
Proof. Consider a semi-separating equilibrium. The total expected cost
under workfare and welfare are respectively given by:
γ1
γs
bL(c
s) + (1− γ
1
γs
)bsH(c
s) + γ1bL(c
s) (A.7)
and
γ1
γs
bL(0) + (1− γ
1
γs
)bsH(0) + γ
1bL(c
s). (A.8)
As bsH(c
s) = 0, workfare costs more (less) than welfare iﬀ
γ1
γs
> (<)
bsH(0)
bsH(0) + [bL(c
s)− bL(0)] . (A.9)
Since the rhs is precisely γs, the result follows. ¥
Part 2
If γ1 ∈ [(γs)2, γs], then the total costs under semi-separation with welfare
is higher than the total cost under full separation with a work requirement
min{cd, cmax}.
Proof. A semi-separating equilibrium with welfare costs
γ1
γs
bL(0) + (1− γ
1
γs
)bsH(0) + γ
1bL(c
s) = bL(0) + γ
1bL(c
s). (A.10)
Separation with workfare costs
γ1bL(min{cd, cmax}) + (1− γ1)bdH(min{cd, cmax}) + γ1bL(0). (A.11)
The latter is cheaper iﬀ
(1− γ1)bL(0) + γ1bL(cs)
−γ1bL(min{cd, cmax})− (1− γ1)bdH(min{cd, cmax}) > 0
m
1− γ1
γ1
>
bL(min{cd, cmax})− bL(cs)
bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
(A.12)
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Since γ1 < γs, we have that 1−γ
1
γ1
> 1−γ
s
γs
= bL(c
s)−bL(0)
bL(0)
, and thus it is suﬃcient
to prove that
bL(c
s)− bL(0)
bL(0)
>
bL(min{cd, cmax})− bL(cs)
bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
(A.13)
If cd = min{cd, cmax}, bdH(min{cd, cmax}) = 0 and the condition reduces to
2bL(c
s) > bL(0) + bL(c
d) (A.14)
which can easily be verified to be the case.22
Let us then consider the case where cmax = min{cd, cmax}. Then the condition
can be written as
bL(0)− bdH(cmax)
bL(0)
>
z − bL(cs)
bL(cs)− bL(0) (A.15)
Clearly, when cco < cs < cmax, this is satisfied since the rhs then vanishes.
This leaves us with the case where cs < cco < cmax.
Because z−bL(c
s)
bL(cs)−bL(0) =
cco
cs
− 1 and bL(0) = bdH(cs), we need to prove that
1− b
d
H(c
max)
bdH(c
s)
>
cco
cs
− 1 (A.16)
or
2− c
co
cs
>
bdH(c
max)
bdH(c
s)
. (A.17)
Since bdH(c
co) > bdH(c
max), it suﬃces to show that
2− c
co
cs
>
bdH(c
co)
bdH(c
s)
. (A.18)
This we claim is to be the case because
(2− c
co
cs
) > 1− vb(0, 0, aH)
vb(bL(0), 0, aH)
(
cco
cs
− 1) > b
d
H(c
co)
bdH(c
s)
. (A.19)
The first inequality follows from the decreasing marginal utility of income. The
second from the fact that bdH(c) is concave in c and the second order Taylor
expansion of bdH(c) around c
s yields for bdH(c
co) :
bdH(c
co) = bdH(c
s)− vb(0, 0, aH)
vb(bL(0), 0, aH)
(aH − aL)(cco − cs) + (−). (A.20)
(Since (aH − aL) = bL(0)cs =
bdH(c
s)
cs
.) ¥
22If cco < cs < cd, the rhs is zero. If cs < cd < cco, the inequality reduces to 2cs > cd. If
cs < cco < cd , the inequality reduces to bL(cs) >
z+bL(0)
2 which is also the case since c
s > cco/2.
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Part 3
If γ1 ∈ [0, (γs)2], the total costs under semi-separation with workfare cs is higher
than the total cost under full separation with a work requirement min{cd, cmax};
unless cmax = min{cd, cmax} and γ1 < γSS: then the opposite is the case.
Proof.
If γ1 < (γs)2, we know that the cheapest semi-separation policy is a work re-
quirement cs. The cheapest separation policy has a work requirementmin{cd, cmax}.
The latter is cheaper if and only if
γ1
γs
bL(c
s) + (1− γ
1
γs
)bsH(c
s) + γ1bL(c
s) >
γ1bL(min{cd, cmax}) + (1− γ1)bdH(min{cd, cmax}) + γ1bL(0)
Using the fact that bsH(c
s) = 0, we get
γ1 >
bdH(min{cd, cmax})
bdH(min{cd, cmax}) + (1 + 1γs )bL(cs) + bL(min{cd, cmax}) + bL(0)
.
If cd < cmax, bdH(min{cd, cmax}) vanishes and the inequality is trivially veri-
fied. On the other hand, if cd > cmax, bdH(min{cd, cmax}) remains positive, viz.
bdH(c
max) > 0. Since bL(cmax) = z, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for sepa-
rating with work requirement cmax to be the cheapest is that
γ1 >
bdH(c
max)
bdH(c
max) + (1 + 1
γs
)bL(cs) + z + bL(0)
. (A.21)
The rhs of this inequality was in the text defined as γSS. ¥
Proof of proposition 3
We need to prove that Gd < γd or alternatively that 1
Gd
> 1
γd
. Using the
definitions for the critical values, this is equivalent to proving that
bL(min{Cd, cmax})− bL(0)
BdH(0)−BdH(min{Cd, cmax})
>
bL(min{cd, cmax})− bL(0)
bdH(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
. (A.22)
Suppose first that Cd > cmax. Then also cd > cmax, and the above inequality
reduces to
bdH(0)−BdH(0) > bdH(cmax)−BdH(cmax). (A.23)
Since bdH(c) is defined as
v(bdH(c), 0, aH) + v (0, 0, aH) = v(bL(c), c, aH) + v(bL(0), 0, aH), (A.24)
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and BdH(c) is defined as
v(BdH(c), 0, aH) + v (0, 0, aH) =
v(bL(c), c, aH) + q
Sv(bL(0), 0, aH) +
¡
1− qS¢ v(0, 0, aH),
we also have that
v(bdH(c), 0, aH)− v(BdH(c), 0, aH) =
¡
1− qS¢ ·D (A.25)
where D def= v(bsH(0), 0, aH)− v(0, 0, aH).
Since (A.25) holds for any c, diﬀerentiation gives
vb(b
d
H(c), 0, aH)
dbdH(c)
dc
= vb(B
d
H(c), 0, aH)
dBdH(c)
dc
,
or
dBdH(c)
dc
=
vb(b
d
H(c), 0, aH)
vb(BdH(c), 0, aH)
dbdH(c)
dc
.
As BdH(c) < b
d
H(c),
vb(b
d
H(c),0,aH)
vb(B
d
H(c),0,aH)
< 1, and d[b
d
H(c)−BdH(c)]
dc < 0. This then implies
(A.23).
The remainder of the proof concerns the case where Cd < cmax. It is divided
into four parts:
Part 1
Cd is defined as
v(0, 0, aH) + v (0, 0, aH) =
v(bL(C
d), Cd, aH) + q
Sv(bL(0), 0, aH) +
¡
1− qS¢ v(0, 0, aH).
Since v(0, 0, aH) = v(bL(cs), cs, aH), this identity may also be written as
v(bL(C
d), Cd, aH) = v(bL(c
s), cs, aH)− q ·D |q=qS . (A.26)
Similarly, BdH(0) must satisfy the identity
v(BdH(0), c
1, aH) + v (0, 0, aH) =
v(bL(0), 0, aH) + q
Sv(bL(0), 0, aH) +
¡
1− qS¢ v(0, 0, aH),
which can be rearranged as
v(BdH(0), 0, aH) = v(bL(0, 0, aH) + q ·D |q=qS (A.27)
= v(bsH(0), 0, aH) + q ·D |q=qS .
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Part 2
Suppose now that q where to change for some reason. How will BdH(0) and C
d
be aﬀected? From (A.27) we get that
∂v(BdH(0), 0, aH)
∂BdH(0)
dBdH(0) = D · dq (A.28)
m
vb(B
dS
H (0), 0, aH)dB
dS
H (0) = D · dq. (A.29)
And likewise, from (A.26):
∂v(bsH(C
d), 0, aH)
∂Cd
dCd = −D · dq
m (A.30)
vb(b
s
H(C
d), 0, aH)
dbsH(C
d)
dCd
dCd = −D · dqS. (A.31)
Therefore,
dBdH(0)/dq
dCd/dq
= −vb(b
s
H(C
d), 0, aH)
vb(BdH(0), 0, aH)
dbsH(C
d)
dCd
. (A.32)
Part 3
The defining equation for BdH(c
1) is
v(BdH(c
1), 0, aH) + v (0, 0, aH) =
v(bL(c
1), c1, aH) + q
Sv(bL(0), 0, aH) +
¡
1− qS¢ v(0, 0, aH),
which can be rearranged as
v(BdH(c
1), 0, aH) = v(b
s
H(c
1), 0, aH) + q ·D |q=qS . (A.33)
Whence,
dBdH(c
1)
dc1
=
vb(b
s
H(c
1), 0, aH)
vb(BdH(c
1), 0, aH)
dbsH(c
1)
dc1
. (A.34)
Evaluating this derivative at c1 = Cd, the rhs denominator becomes vb(0, 0, aH)
(because Cd < cmax).
Therefore, (A.32) may also be written as
dBdH(0)/dq
dCd/dq
=
vb(0, 0, aH)
vb(BdH(0), 0, aH)
·
−dB
d
H(c
1)
dc1
|c1=Cd
¸
. (A.35)
Because the ratio of marginal utilities multiplying the rhs square bracket term
is larger than one, we have
dBdH(0)/dq
S
dCd/dqS
>
·
−dB
d
H(c
1)
dc1
|c1=Cd
¸
(A.36)
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Part 4
Recall that BdH(c
1) is a decreasing and strictly concave function in c1. Thus the
absolute slope of this function at Cd is larger than B
d
H(0)
Cd
, the slope of the cord
connecting (0, BdH(0)) and (C
d, 0). We may therefore write that
dBdH(0)/dq
dCd/dq
>
BdH(0)
Cd
. (A.37)
Because
d
dq
µ
BdH(0)
Cd
¶
=
1
Cd
µ
dBdH(0)
dq
− B
d
H(0)
Cd
dCd
dq
¶
(A.38)
=
dCd/dq
Cd
µ
dBdH(0)/dq
dCd/dq
− B
d
H(0)
Cd
¶
,
we have just shown that ddq
³
BdH(0)
Cd
´
> 0. But since q = qS < 1 in the case of
poverty reducing eﬀort, and q = 1 in the case without poverty reducing eﬀort,
we also have shown that B
d
H(0)
Cd
<
bdH(0)
cd
. ¥
Proof of proposition 5
Case 1: cs < cco
(a) 0 < c < cs :
1
γ1
dEK2
dc
= aH{π(∆(c, 1))− γs}+
Ã
[bL(c)− bsH(c)]
dπ
d∆|{z} ∂∆(c, 1)∂c| {z }
!
(A.39)
(−) (−)
Since ∆(c, 1) < ∆(0, 1), π will take a higher value than as for c = 0. The
derivative will therefore become less negative as c is raised above 0.
Let us investigate the derivative as c approaches cs from the left:
1
γ1
dEK2
dc
|c→cs− = aH (π(∆(cs, 1))− γs) +
Ã
aLc
s dπ
d∆|{z} ∂∆(c, 1)∂c |c→cs−| {z }
!
(A.40)
(−) (−)
From the analysis of the separation equilibrium, we know that π(∆(cs, 1 −
qS)) = γs. Thus, if we choose a work requirement cs with probability 1, L will
not put in more than the minimal eﬀort level (referred to as emin in the middle
panel of figure 6) and we get π(∆(cs, 1)) > γs. It then follows that the first
round bracket term in (A.40) is also positive. Thus, as c approaches cs from
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the left, second period costs will increase. Since EK2(·) is continuous in c, this
means that there exists a c∗ ∈ (0, cs) where EK2(·) reaches a local minimum:
aL − aH(1− π(∆(c∗, 1)) = aHc∗(− dπd∆)
∂∆(c∗, 1)
∂c
(A.41)
or
γs − π(∆(c∗, 1))
(− dπd∆)vb(bH(c∗), 0, aH)(aH − aL)
= c∗ (A.42)
(b) cs < c < cco:
1
γ1
∂K
∂c
= aLπ + bL(c)
dπ
d∆|{z} ∂∆(c, 1)∂c| {z } < 0 (A.43)
(−) (0)
(c) cco < c < cmax:
1
γ1
∂K
∂c
= z
dπ
d∆|{z} ∂∆(c, 1)∂c| {z } < 0 (A.44)
(−) (+)
We can therefore conclude that K(c) reaches a local minimum at c∗ ∈ (0, cs)
and cmax (and local maximum at 0 and cco).
Case 2: cs > cco
(a) c < cco :
1
γ1
dEK2
dc
= aH{π(∆(c, 1))− γs + aL
aH
(1− c
co
cs
)}
+
µ
[bL(c)− bsH(c)]
dπ
d∆
∂∆(c, 1)
∂c
¶
(A.45)
= aH{π(∆(c, 1))− γs + aL
aH
(1− c
co
cs
)}
+ aHc
dπ
d∆|{z} ∂∆(c, 1)∂c| {z }
(−) (−)
Since ∆(c, 1) < ∆(0, 1), π will take a higher value than for c = 0, and the first
round bracket term increases. Thus, if the marginal cost of a work requirement
was already positive for c = 0, it it becomes even more positive, and this is
reinforced by the second term.
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On the other hand, if the marginal cost of a work requirement was negative
for c = 0, the increase in c makes it less negative.
(b) For all cco < c < cs:
Let us investigate the derivative as c approaches cs from the left:
1
γ1
∂K
∂c
|c→cs− = aH
µ
π(∆(cs, 1))− γs + aL
aH
(1− c
co
cs
)
¶
+
Ã
(aL + aH)c
s dπ
d∆|{z} ∂∆(c, 1)∂c |c→cs−| {z }
!
(A.46)
(−) (−)
For the same reasons as in case 1 we have π(∆(cs, 1)) > γs, and therefore that
second period costs increase as c approaches cs.
Since EK2(·) is continuous in c, the results of (a) and (b) imply that there
exists a c∗ ∈ (0, cs) where EK2(·) reaches a local minimum if and only if ∂K
∂c
|c=0 <
0.
(c) For all cs < c < cmax:
1
γ1
dEK2
dc
= z
dπ
d∆|{z} ∂∆(c, 1)∂c| {z } < 0 (A.47)
(−) (+)
We can therefore conclude case 2 by saying that we have local minima at 0
and cmax (if ∂K
∂c
|c=0 > 0), and local minima at c∗ ∈ (0, cs) and cmax (if ∂K∂c |c=0 <
0). ¥
Suﬃcient conditions for L-people not to take-the-money-and-run
Consider a first period program
©
[bL(c
1), c1] ,
£
bdH(c
1), 0
¤ª
intended to separate
the two types. An L -person will not choose
£
bdH(c
1), 0
¤
iﬀ
v
¡
bdH(c
1), 0, aL
¢
+ v(0, 0, aL) ≤ v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, aL
¢
+ v (bL(0), 0, aL) . (A.48)
We will first give suﬃcient conditions for this to hold when c1 = 0, and then
show that if it holds for c1 = 0, it will also hold for any c1 ∈ (0, cmax].
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Part 1
Lemma 7 vb(b, 0, a) ·L(b, 0, a) suﬃciently convex in b guarantees that a low abil-
ity person does not to take the money and run (t-m-r) when c1 = 0. Suﬃcient
conditions for convexity of vbL are (taken together): decreasing absolute risk aver-
sion regarding consumption, normality of leisure, a labour supply function that is
convex in lump sum income.
Proof.
By the definition of bdH(c
1), we have that
v
¡
bdH(0), 0, aH
¢
+ v(0, 0, aH) = 2v (bL(0), 0, aH) , (A.49)
since bsH(0) = bL(0).
We would like to show that
v
¡
bdH(0), 0, aL
¢
+ v(0, 0, aL) < 2v (bL(0), 0, aL) . (A.50)
Define
RHS(c1, a) = v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, a
¢
+ v(bL(0), 0, a) (A.51)
and
LHS(c1, a) = v
¡
bdH(c
1), 0, a
¢
+ v(0, 0, a). (A.52)
Then (A.50) follows from (A.49) when d[RHS(0,a)−LHS(0,a)]da < 0.
Since
v(b, 0, a) = u(b+ aL∗, 1− L∗), (A.53)
where L∗ is the optimal labour supply satisfying the foc uxa− u`, we have that
∂v(b, 0, a)
∂a
= vb(b, 0, a) · L(b, 0, a) = (vbL)(b,0,a). (A.54)
Therefore,
d[RHS(0, a)− LHS(0, a)]
da
= {(vbL)(bL(0),0,a) − (vbL)(bdH(0),0,a)}
− {(vbL)(0,0,a ) − (vbL)(bL(0),0,a)}. (A.55)
With decreasing marginal utility of income and normality of leisure, vbL is
decreasing in b, and both curly bracket terms are positive. Consider then the
figure below.
Insert figure A here.
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If vbL is suﬃciently convex in b, the above expression is negative.
The second derivative of vbL w.r.t. b is given by
∂2(vbL)
∂b2
= uxxxL+ 2uxx
∂L
∂b
+ ux
∂2L
∂b2
(A.56)
Decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that uxxx > 0. The second term is
positive since leisure is assumed to be a normal good. Utility maximisation does
not impose restrictions on the sign of ∂
2L
∂b2
. It can go either way. With Cobb-
Douglas preferences, for example, labour supply is linear in lump sum income.
The above argument is valid for bdH(0) slightly above 2bL(0). But, as we
have argued in the text, decreasing marginal utility of income is the reason why
bdH(0) > 2bL(0). The faster marginal utility in income is falling, the more will
bdH(0) exceed 2bL(0). But while the extent to which b
d
H(0) exceeds 2bL(0) is
dependent on the degree of absolute risk aversion, the convexity of vbL depends on
the sensitivity of absolute risk aversion to income and on the curvature properties
of the labour supply function. The two aspects are therefore not at odds with
one another. ¥
Part 2
Lemma 8 If an L-person does not have an incentive to t-m-r when c1 = 0, he
will not have it either for any c1 ∈ (0, cmax].
Proof.
Suppose that the low ability person does not have an incentive to t-m-r when
the work requirement is zero, i.e.
v
¡
bdH(c
1), 0, aL
¢
+ v(0, 0, aL) ≤ v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, aL
¢
+ v (bL(0), 0, aL) (A.57)
for c1 = 0.
Since bdH(c
1) is decreasing in c1, the utility when dissembling as H, will cer-
tainly decrease. On the other hand, for any c1 ∈ [0, cco], v (bL(c1), 0, aL) =
v (bL(0), 0, aL), so that the intertemporal utility when behaving honest remains
the same. We may thus conclude that for any c1 ∈ (0, cco], the low ability person
will not t-m-r if such incentive is absent for c1 = 0.
It then remains to check whether t-m-r may become lucrative for c1 ∈ (cco, cmax].
Let us for that purpose analyse d[RHS(c
1,aL)−LHS(c1,aL)]
dc1 for c
1 ∈ (cco, cmax]. If
this expression is always negative, we can conclude that the incentives to t-m-r
only become weaker.
44
Substitution gives us
d[RHS(c1, aL)− LHS(c1, aL)]
dc1
=
∂v(bL(c
1), c1, aL)
∂c1
− vb(bdH(c1), 0, aL)
dbdH(c
1)
dc1
=
∂u(z, 1− c1)
∂c1
+ vb(b
d
H(c
1), 0, aL)
vb(b
s
H(c
1), 0, aH)
vb(bdH(c
1), 0, aH)
aH ,
where we have made use of lemma 2 and the fact that for the fact c1 ≥ cco, bsH(c1) =
z.
Since H is unconstrained, the foc w.r.t his optimal earnings (y∗) allows us to
write vb(bsH(c
1), 0, aH)aH as u`(z + y∗, 1− c1 − y∗aH ). We then get
d[RHS(c1, aL)− LHS(c1, aL)]
dc1
=
− u`(z, 1− c1) + vb(b
d
H(c
1), 0, aL)
vb(bdH(c
1), 0, aH)
u`(z + y
∗, 1− c1 − y
∗
aH
) >
− u`(z, 1− c1) + u`(z + y∗, 1− c1 − y
∗
aH
)
where the inequality follows from vb(b
d
H(c
1),0,aL)
vb(b
d
H(c
1),0,aH)
> 1. Because consumption is
a normal good, the last expression is positive, and we can conclude that the
incentive to t-m-r continues to deteriorate for values of c1 ≥ cco. ¥
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cmax
z-bL(0)
z
bL(0)
cs cco
aH-aL
aL
a
z
bL(0)
cscco
aH-aL
aH
aL
z-bL(0)
b
bL(c)
bHs(c)
bL(c)
bHs(c)
cmax
Figure 1.  bL(c) and bHs(c) when
cs<cco (a) and cs>cco (b).
Figure 1:
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Figure 2.  bL(c) () and bHd(c) ().
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Figure 3.  The reaction curves of WA ( ) and H () and the different continuation equilibria.
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Figure 6.  The reaction curves of WA ( ) and L () and the different continuation equilibria.
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Figure 7.  Total cost with efficient separating programmes with ()
and without () the possibility of PRE.
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Figure 8.  Expected second period cost as a function of the work
requirement to which the WA commits (for cs<cco).
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Figure A.  vb(b,0,a)L(b,0,a)  sufficiently convex in b.
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